Institutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep Determinants of Economic Growth. 2001.Abstract



An introduction to an edited volume of analytic growth narratives.

Comments at a Conference on Immigration and the Welfare State. 2001.Abstract



Why is trade in labor services treated so differently than trade in goods or capital?

The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Really Mattered. 2001.Abstract



A paper prepared for the UNDP.

Rodrik D, Kaplan E. Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?. 2001.Abstract



Revised February 2001. The answer depends on the counterfactual, but if the relevant alternative was an IMF-style program, they worked very well indeed.

Frankel J, Rose A. Comments on"Estimating the Effects of Currency Unions on Trade and Output,". 2000.Abstract



October 21, 2000 version

Dollar D, Kraay A. Comments on"Trade, Growth, and Poverty,". 2000.Abstract


Exchange Rate Regimes and Institutional Arrangements in the Shadow of Capital Flows. 2000. PDF

A paper for a conference in Malaysia.

Trade Policy Reform as Institutional Reform. 2000.Abstract



Ask not what it does for your exports, but what it does for the quality of your institutions.

Rodrik D, Rodriguez F. Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence. 2000.Abstract



Newly revised, May 2000. A re-examination of the relationship between trade policy and economic growth and a critical review of the literature. Published in Macroeconomics Annual 2000, eds. Ben Bernanke and Kenneth S. Rogoff, MIT Press for NBER, Cambridge, MA, 2001.

Development Strategies for the Next Century. 2000.Abstract



A reiteration and integration of various themes from some of my previous papers.

Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them. 2000.Abstract



October 1999. Paper prepared for an IMF conference on Second Generation Reforms.  Revised version published in Studies in Comparative International Development, Fall 2000.

Participatory Politics, Social Cooperation, and Economic Stability. 1999.Abstract



December 1999. A short paper for the American Economic Association meetings in Boston, January 7-9, 2000.

Rodrik D, van Ypersele T. Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict and International Tax Coordination. Journal of International Economics. 1999;54 (1).Abstract



Revised, October 1999. A formal model on why international tax coordination may be needed to get labor to go along with capital mobility.

Bhagwati J, Srinivasan TN. Comments on"Outward-Orientation and Development: Are the Revisionists Right?". 1999.Abstract



(September 1999 version). This is actually the text of a letter sent to the authors (minus some personal remarks), which I have decided to post because I am frequently asked about this paper.

How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?. 1999.Abstract



Revised September 1999. Some wild speculation on the future of the world economy. Published in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 2000.

Why Is There So Much Economic Insecurity in Latin America?. 1999.Abstract


August 1999. Revised version in CEPAL Review.

Rodrik D, Velasco A. Short-Term Capital Flows. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. 1999.Abstract



The consequences (and causes) thereof.

Governing the Global Economy: Does One Architectural Style Fit All?. 1999.Abstract



April 1999 (Edited June 1999). How far will the new international financial architecture go, and what will it cost the developing countries?

Making Openness Work: The New Global Economy and the Developing Countries
Making Openness Work: The New Global Economy and the Developing Countries. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council; 1999.Abstract

Policy makers in the developing world are grappling with the new dilemmas created by openness to trade and capital flows. What role, if any, remains for the state in promoting industrialization? Does openness exacerbate inequality, and if so what can be done about it? What is the best way to handle turbulence emanating from the world economy, and the fickleness of international capital flows in particular? This book argues that successful integration in the world economy requires a complementary set of policies and institutions at home. Policy makers have to reinforce their external strategy of liberalization with an internal strategy that gives the state substantial responsibility in fostering the accumulation of physical and human capital and in mediating social conflicts. - Excerpted from abstract.

Democracies Pay Higher Wages. Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1999. 1998.Abstract



The title says it all. Revised and expanded version of NBER Working Paper No. 6364.