Publications

Working Paper
Rodrik D, Sabel C. Building a Good Jobs Economy. Working Paper. PDF
Preliminary Draft, April 2019
Forthcoming
Rodrik D, Mukand S. The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy. The Economic Journal. Forthcoming.Abstract

This paper develops a taxonomy of political regimes that distinguishes between three sets of rights - property rights, political rights and civil rights. The truly distinctive nature of liberal democracy is the protection of civil rights (equal treatment by the state for all groups) in addition to the other two. The paper shows how democratic transitions that are the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care about political rights), generically fail to produce liberal democracy. Instead, the emergence of liberal democracy requires low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages.

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2019
The Trilemma
The Trilemma. Harvard Magazine. 2019; July-August.
Putting Global Governance in its Place, in World Bank ABCDE Conference. Washington, D.C. ; 2019. PDF
Why We Must Resist Economic Conventional Wisdom
Why We Must Resist Economic Conventional Wisdom. 2019.
Dani Rodrik talks to INET President Rob Johnson about Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP). April 17, 2019.
Rodrik D, Di Tella R. Labor Market Shocks and the Demand for Trade Protection: Evidence from Online Surveys. 2019.Abstract
We study preferences for government action in response to layoffs resulting from different types of labor-market shocks. We consider the following shocks: technological change, a demand shift, bad management, and three kinds of international outsourcing. Respondents are given a choice among no government action, compensatory transfers, and trade protection. In response to these shocks, support for government intervention generally rises sharply and is heavily biased towards trade protection. Demand for import protection increases significantly in all cases, except for the “bad management” shock. Trade shocks generate more demand for protectionism, and among trade shocks, outsourcing to a developing country elicits greater demand for protectionism than outsourcing to a developed country. The “bad management” shock is the only scenario that induces a desired increase in compensatory transfers. Effects appear to be heterogeneous across subgroups with different political preferences and education. Trump supporters are more protectionist than Clinton supporters, but preferences seem easy to manipulate: Clinton supporters primed with trade shocks are as protectionist as baseline Trump voters. Highlighting labor abuses in the exporting country increases the demand for trade protection by Clinton supporters but not Trump supporters.
PDF
NBER Working Paper, March 2019
Economics After Neoliberalism
Economics After Neoliberalism. 2019.
Boston Review, February 15, 2019
2018
New Technologies, Global Value Chains, and the Developing Economies. 2018. PDF
University of Oxford, Pathways for Prosperity Commission, September 2018
Dani Rodrik Conversation with Ezra Klein (Vox.com) on Trade
Dani Rodrik Conversation with Ezra Klein (Vox.com) on Trade. 2018.
July 19, 2018
Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?. AEA Papers and Proceedings 2018. 2018;(108) :196-199.Abstract

I distinguish between political and economic populism. Both are averse to agencies of restraint, or, equivalently, delegation to technocrats or external rules. In the economic domain, delegation to independent agencies (domestic or foreign) occurs in two different contexts: (a) in order to prevent the majority from harming itself in the future; and (b) in order to cement a redistribution arising from a temporary political advantage for the longer-term. Economic policy restraints that arise in the first case are desirable; those that arise in the second case are much less so.

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Second Thoughts on Economics Rules. Journal of Economic Methodology. 2018.
What Do Trade Agreements Really Do?. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2018;23 (2) :73-90.Abstract
As trade agreements have evolved and gone beyond import tariffs and quotas into regulatory rules and harmonization, they have become more difficult to fit into received economic theory. Nevertheless, most economists continue to regard trade agreements such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) favorably. The default view seems to be that these arrangements get us closer to free trade by reducing transaction costs associated with regulatory differences or explicit protectionism. An alternative perspective is that trade agreements are the result of rent-seeking, self-interested behavior on the part of politically well-connected firms – international banks, pharmaceutical companies, multinational firms. They may result in freer, mutually beneficial trade, through exchange of market access. But they are as likely to produce purely redistributive outcomes under the guise of “freer trade.”
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Globalization Has Contributed to Tearing Societies Apart
Globalization Has Contributed to Tearing Societies Apart. 2018.
ProMarket, March 29, 2018
Rodrik D, Mukand S. The Political Economy of Ideas: On Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking. 2018.Abstract

We develop a conceptual framework to highlight the role of ideas as a catalyst for policy and institutional change. We make an explicit distinction between ideas and vested interests and show how they feed into each other. In doing so the paper integrates the Keynes-Hayek perspective on the importance of ideas with the currently more fashionable Stigler-Becker (in-terests only) approach to political economy. We distinguish between two kinds of ideational politics – the battle among different worldviews on the efficacy of policy (worldview politics) versus the politics of victimhood, pride and identity (identity politics). Political entrepreneurs discover identity and policy ‘memes’ (narratives, cues, framing) that shift beliefs about how the world works or a person’s belief of who he is (i.e. identity). Our framework identifies a complementarity between worldview politics and identity politics and illustrates how they may reinforce each other. In particular, an increase in identity polarization may be associated with a shift in views about how the world works. Furthermore, an increase in income inequality is likely to result in a greater incidence of ideational politics. Finally, we show how ideas may not just constrain, but also ‘bite’ the interests that helped propagate them in the first instance.

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Populism and the Economics of Globalization. 2018.Abstract
Populism may seem like it has come out of nowhere, but it has been on the rise for a while. I argue that economic history and economic theory both provide ample grounds for anticipating that advanced stages of economic globalization would produce a political backlash. While the backlash may have been predictable, the specific form it took was less so. I distinguish between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism, which differ with respect to the societal cleavages that populist politicians highlight. The first has been predominant in Latin America, and the second in Europe. I argue that these different reactions are related to the relative salience of different types of globalization shocks.
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Journal of International Business Policy, 2018
What Does a True Populism Look Like? It Looks Like the New Deal
What Does a True Populism Look Like? It Looks Like the New Deal. 2018.
The New York Times, February 21, 2018

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